Tests / test (pull_request) Successful in 1m10s
Brings preauth from 18/34 to 30/34 conformance (auth-gateway profile). The
remaining four checks all depend on files this branch cannot change (see below).
PHP toolchain (§1)
- require.php >=8.4 -> ^8.5, and pin config.platform to 8.5.0. The old
constraint also permitted PHP 9, which is not a promise we can keep.
composer.lock regenerated with --lock: content-hash + platform-overrides
only, zero dependency version movement.
- friendsofphp/php-cs-fixer * -> ^3.95. A wildcard meant CI was not
reproducible.
PHPStan (§2.2)
- vendor the shared phpstan.neon.dist (level 6) + a generated baseline.
187 errors are captured rather than fixed; the baseline should only shrink
from here.
- add phpstan/phpstan:^2.1 to require-dev.
Code style (§8.2)
- vendor the shared .php-cs-fixer.dist.php (@Symfony + @Symfony:risky +
declare_strict_types) and apply it: 59 of 67 files reformatted.
- Verified this is a formatting change, not a behaviour change: all 313 tests
pass after the reformat, all in_array() calls already passed strict=true,
and the remaining edits are @Symfony:risky idiom (yoda conditions, \count(),
self:: over the class name).
Repository layout (§4.4)
- docs/{Caddyfile,compose.yaml,example.env} -> docs/examples/, with
example.env becoming the conventional .env.example. This is the layout
GUIDING-LIGHT already cites preauth as doing correctly — it just needed
renaming.
- update the four readme.md references and a stale compose.yaml comment.
- docs/v1.1-plan.md references are left alone deliberately: it is a historical
plan recording what was done at the time, not live documentation.
Licence and security policy (§7)
- add LICENSE (uniform MIT, matching composer.json).
- add SECURITY.md describing the actual threat model: per-request
allow/intercept, no caching of the login flow, app-set security headers,
TOTP, and the fact that REMOTE_USER is trusted input.
Mobile accessibility (§3.3a)
- templates/base.html.twig: drop maximum-scale=1 and add viewport-fit=cover.
preauth was the one app already past the font-size precondition (controls
render at 21.6px = 0.9em x 24px), so removing the lock is safe here and
restores pinch-zoom for Android users.
Conformance tooling (§8.2)
- vendor .ci/conformance.sh and .ci/css-control-size.py so the check runs
from a checkout rather than fetching from the LAN-only private/ci.
- .editorconfig synced from the version that keeps the Caddyfile tab rule.
Not included (blocked by the .gitea/workflows pre-receive hook):
- ci-composer-audit, ci-composer-validate, ci-reusable-workflows.
Workflow files may only change via a trusted ref, so the caller files are
staged but not committed.
Also not included: dockerfile-nonroot (§6.4). Adding USER to an image with
VOLUME [/config, /data] changes volume ownership and needs an actual container
build/run to verify, so it goes in its own change.
78 lines
2.5 KiB
Caddyfile
78 lines
2.5 KiB
Caddyfile
# preauth example Caddyfile
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# --- anti-caching guard for the login flow ---
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# The login page, failed logins, redirects, and rate-limit pages must never
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# be stored or replayed by a browser or intermediate cache. If they are,
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# an aggressive cache (notably older Safari) can resurrect a stale pre-auth
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# response — appearing to log a user back out after a refresh. preauth
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# sends these headers itself; mirroring them here with `header_down` keeps
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# the guarantee at the edge. Import this snippet inside every `forward_auth`
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# block:
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#
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# forward_auth preauth { ...; import preauth_no_store }
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#
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# Note: 2xx auth responses are consumed by Caddy's forward_auth check and
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# never reach the browser, and the protected service's own responses are
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# not affected — so the cache headers of your services are left alone.
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(preauth_no_store) {
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header_down Cache-Control "no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, proxy-revalidate, max-age=0, s-maxage=0"
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header_down Pragma "no-cache"
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header_down Expires "0"
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header_down Surrogate-Control "no-store"
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header_down Vary "*"
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}
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# example of securing full service
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# TODO replace domain and service name and port
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service.example.com {
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forward_auth preauth {
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uri {uri}
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copy_headers Remote-User
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import preauth_no_store
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}
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reverse_proxy service-container:80
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}
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# you can choose to only restrict select paths
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# or any other Caddy match criteria, if desired
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# IE: https://protected.example.com/secure/
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protected.example.com {
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# note any request that does not start with "/secure/" is NOT protected
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forward_auth /secure/* preauth {
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uri {uri}
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copy_headers Remote-User
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import preauth_no_store
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}
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reverse_proxy protected-service:9000
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}
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# optionally, if you want to use a subdomain for central preauth
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# set SUBDOMAIN_REDIRECT to true
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# and AUTH_SUBDOMAIN to match the subdomain you use here
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auth.example.com {
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reverse_proxy preauth
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}
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# --- public rate-limited access (v1.1) ---
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# Configure PUBLIC_PATHS env var to specify which paths are public.
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# Example: PUBLIC_PATHS=/public/**
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# Unauthenticated visitors to public paths are rate-limited separately
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# from login attempts. Authenticated users bypass the public rate limiter.
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#
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# This example protects all of Gitea except /public/** which is
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# publicly accessible but rate-limited (e.g., 100 req/min, 500 req/hr).
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git.example.com {
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forward_auth preauth {
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uri {uri}
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copy_headers Remote-User
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import preauth_no_store
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}
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reverse_proxy gitea:3000
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}
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# In preauth's .env:
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# PUBLIC_PATHS=/public/**
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# PUBLIC_BURST_COUNT=100
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# PUBLIC_BURST_TIME=60
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# PUBLIC_UPPER_COUNT=500
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# PUBLIC_UPPER_TIME=3600
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