Corrects a design error in the previous commit. I had exposed register-begin as
a listener operation and gated it on a session cookie, but the approved flow has
no session at that point: the whole point is that a valid TOTP code is what
authorises registration, and the session is only issued once the new credential
has been verified.
Two consequences, both bad:
- There is no session cookie to check, so the gate could never have worked. It
would have been dead code that looked like a security control.
- More seriously, a listener-side register-begin would hand out a challenge
without proving anything. Anyone could obtain ceremony options and attempt
registration. The cookie check was not a weak control; the operation itself
was the hole.
Registration is now started by LoginManager, after it has verified both the code
and the nonce, and its options are returned with the login response. That is the
flow in the plan, and it keeps nonce validation in the one place that already
enforces it. The capability for register-finish is the single-use ceremonyId,
which is server-issued and bound to the identity that passed the check.
The listener now serves three operations, and a test pins that register-begin is
not one of them.
Also adds Payload::$register so the checkbox intent survives from the form to
LoginManager, and moves the ceremony marker constant to AppConstants since both
LoginManager and the listener now produce marked responses.
Priority 70 sits after RejectListener (77) and before LoginListener (66), and
both bounds are load-bearing:
- After 77 so a rate-limited IP never reaches a ceremony. Passkeys cannot be
used to sidestep a lockout (D3), which is the point of the reviewer's third
clarification.
- Before 66 because LoginListener treats any POST to the auth subdomain as a
login attempt. A ceremony finish body has no username/totp, so Payload::load()
returns null and the request would be scored as a failed login, burning a
rate-limit token for every legitimate passkey login.
Verified in the live container rather than assumed: debug:event-dispatcher
confirms 77 -> 70 -> 66.
Other properties asserted by tests: every header-bearing request gets a JSON
response so fetch() callers never receive HTML; registration identity comes from
the live session, never the request body; a failed ceremony is indistinguishable
from a wrong TOTP code and spends the same shared budget; and begin is bounded
by a separate resource guard that deliberately does not consume failure budget.
The listener also marks its responses so SecurityHeadersListener can apply
no-store: these are the only browser-facing 2xx this application produces, since
the auth subdomain has no forward_auth in front of it. CSP gains
publickey-credentials-get/-create only when passkeys are available, so the
unavailable case stays byte-identical to before.
SessionIssuer now owns 'grant access after authenticating', which LoginManager
previously did internally. The passkey ceremony needs the same behaviour, and
two implementations would inevitably drift — most likely in cookie attributes,
where a difference stays invisible until it breaks in a browser.
LoginManager keeps what is specific to code-based login: verifying the TOTP or
backup code and enforcing the single-use nonce. Its 18 existing tests pass
unchanged, which is the evidence that this is behaviour-preserving rather than a
rewrite.
Also folds the redundant early-return into a single guard in checkToken so the
success path reads straight through.
Builds both WebAuthn ceremonies on top of the library, with real cryptography
proven in tests rather than stubbed:
- PasskeyCeremonyStore: server-authoritative, single-use challenge state in the
nonceCache pool. The client's challenge copy is never trusted, and consume()
deletes before verifying so a replay cannot retry the same challenge.
- PasskeyManager: registration and login ceremonies. Library types are confined
to this class and PasskeyCeremonyFactory. Failures return null rather than
distinguishing unknown-credential from bad-signature, so the endpoint is not
an enumeration oracle.
- PasskeyTestHelper: builds genuinely valid ceremonies (real P-256 keypair,
COSE key, signed authenticatorData, CBOR attestation object).
- PasskeyRealCryptoSpikeTest: proves registration and assertion verify, that
http:// origins are refused (D4), that challenges and rpIdHash are bound, and
that a synchronised passkey with a constant zero counter can log in repeatedly.
The library default (ThrowExceptionIfInvalid) requires the reported counter to
be strictly greater than the stored one. Synchronised passkeys report a
constant 0 forever, so the default rejects a brand-new credential on its first
login — and only on real hardware, never in a unit test that increments the
counter.
The replacement still rejects a counter that moves backwards, which is the only
signal the counter can carry. Clone detection remains explicitly not a property
this feature claims; see SECURITY.md.
Persistence for registered passkeys, backed by sessionCache so credentials
survive a container restart the way sessions do.
The pool is wrapped in MonitorCacheKeys, matching LoginManager and
BackupCodeManager. Without that wrapper the credentials would live only in the
APCu-side pool and vanish on the next restart, because PersistCache::persist()
only flushes keys a monitor recorded. A test asserts visibility to the
persistent pool rather than trusting the wrapper.
Two storage hazards found while building this and covered by tests:
- makeCacheKey() is not injective for base64url. It collapses the whole
punctuation alphabet to "_", so "abc-def" and "abc_def" would share one
cache slot and one credential would silently overwrite the other.
Credential ids are therefore hashed, and a test uses precisely that pair.
- A record's own credential id is authoritative. An index entry pointing at
a record that disagrees with its key is rejected rather than trusted.
Unreadable or wrong-shaped entries degrade to "credential unavailable" so a
corrupt value cannot 500 the login page.
PasskeyCeremonyFactory is the single seam onto webauthn-lib: it builds the
serializer and pins attestation to `none` only, so a future version that moves
or renames library types touches one file.
Suite: 353 tests / 831 assertions, 100% coverage on all new files.
phpstan level 6 clean, php-cs-fixer clean, conformance 35/35.
Groundwork for passkey authentication, with the feature switched off by
default and no behaviour change when it is off.
Decision D1: passkeys require central authentication. A passkey is scoped to
a relying party spanning the base domain, which only exists when
SUBDOMAIN_REDIRECT is on and AUTH_SUBDOMAIN resolves to a base domain. The
RP ID is therefore always that base domain, never the request host.
Decision D4: HTTPS is required and is not exemptible. The allowed origin is
built as https://{authSubdomain} from configuration and never from the
request, so an http:// origin cannot be accepted, and isAvailableFor()
additionally refuses to offer the UI on a non-secure connection. The
deprecated setSecuredRelyingPartyId() escape hatch is not used and there is
deliberately no override that could reintroduce one.
Enabling PASSKEY_ENABLED without a usable configuration is a hard error via
a non-optional cache warmer, because entrypoint.sh runs cache:warmup on every
production boot: a misconfigured deployment fails to start instead of
offering a button that cannot work.
Also drops 12 obsolete phpstan-baseline entries for TotpTestHelper: adding
#[\Override] to its anonymous clock removed the rule violation at its source
rather than suppressing it.
Suite: 333 tests / 770 assertions (was 313 / 738), 100% coverage on new
files. phpstan level 6 clean, php-cs-fixer clean, conformance 35/35.
Brings preauth from 18/34 to 30/34 conformance (auth-gateway profile). The
remaining four checks all depend on files this branch cannot change (see below).
PHP toolchain (§1)
- require.php >=8.4 -> ^8.5, and pin config.platform to 8.5.0. The old
constraint also permitted PHP 9, which is not a promise we can keep.
composer.lock regenerated with --lock: content-hash + platform-overrides
only, zero dependency version movement.
- friendsofphp/php-cs-fixer * -> ^3.95. A wildcard meant CI was not
reproducible.
PHPStan (§2.2)
- vendor the shared phpstan.neon.dist (level 6) + a generated baseline.
187 errors are captured rather than fixed; the baseline should only shrink
from here.
- add phpstan/phpstan:^2.1 to require-dev.
Code style (§8.2)
- vendor the shared .php-cs-fixer.dist.php (@Symfony + @Symfony:risky +
declare_strict_types) and apply it: 59 of 67 files reformatted.
- Verified this is a formatting change, not a behaviour change: all 313 tests
pass after the reformat, all in_array() calls already passed strict=true,
and the remaining edits are @Symfony:risky idiom (yoda conditions, \count(),
self:: over the class name).
Repository layout (§4.4)
- docs/{Caddyfile,compose.yaml,example.env} -> docs/examples/, with
example.env becoming the conventional .env.example. This is the layout
GUIDING-LIGHT already cites preauth as doing correctly — it just needed
renaming.
- update the four readme.md references and a stale compose.yaml comment.
- docs/v1.1-plan.md references are left alone deliberately: it is a historical
plan recording what was done at the time, not live documentation.
Licence and security policy (§7)
- add LICENSE (uniform MIT, matching composer.json).
- add SECURITY.md describing the actual threat model: per-request
allow/intercept, no caching of the login flow, app-set security headers,
TOTP, and the fact that REMOTE_USER is trusted input.
Mobile accessibility (§3.3a)
- templates/base.html.twig: drop maximum-scale=1 and add viewport-fit=cover.
preauth was the one app already past the font-size precondition (controls
render at 21.6px = 0.9em x 24px), so removing the lock is safe here and
restores pinch-zoom for Android users.
Conformance tooling (§8.2)
- vendor .ci/conformance.sh and .ci/css-control-size.py so the check runs
from a checkout rather than fetching from the LAN-only private/ci.
- .editorconfig synced from the version that keeps the Caddyfile tab rule.
Not included (blocked by the .gitea/workflows pre-receive hook):
- ci-composer-audit, ci-composer-validate, ci-reusable-workflows.
Workflow files may only change via a trusted ref, so the caller files are
staged but not committed.
Also not included: dockerfile-nonroot (§6.4). Adding USER to an image with
VOLUME [/config, /data] changes volume ownership and needs an actual container
build/run to verify, so it goes in its own change.
The login page, failed logins, redirects, and rate-limit/error pages could
be stored by the browser (Symfony's default 'no-cache, private' still
permits storage — it only requires revalidation). Older Safari builds may
then replay a stale pre-auth response on refresh, appearing to log the
user back out, or show a previous session after logging in again.
- SecurityHeadersListener: send strict anti-caching headers on non-2xx
responses only (no-store/no-cache/must-revalidate/proxy-revalidate,
max-age=0, s-maxage=0 + Pragma, Expires, Surrogate-Control, Vary: *).
2xx grants (already-authenticated / public access) are consumed by
Caddy's forward_auth check and never reach the browser, and protected
services' own cache headers must stay untouched.
- templates/_script.html.twig: fetch() with cache: 'no-store'; follow
redirects with location.replace() to keep the login page out of history
and the back-forward cache.
- docs/Caddyfile: reusable (preauth_no_store) snippet imported into every
forward_auth block, using header_down so the guarantee holds at the edge
(verified: replaces conflicting upstream values, leaves service
responses alone).
- tests: unit coverage for the listener and functional coverage for the
full HTTP kernel (login/failure/redirect/rate-limit not cacheable;
200 grants untouched); asserts the rendered page carries the JS changes.
- readme/CHANGELOG updates.
The host-prefix regex required at least one character after the slash
(/\+.+/), so a pattern like 'code.example.com/' was silently dropped
instead of matching the root path '/'. Changed \+.+ to \+.* so the
trailing slash alone is accepted as the path '/'.
Added tests covering the exact bug scenario from PUBLIC_PATHS
config: 'code.digitaladapt.com/,code.digitaladapt.com/public/**'
Add PublicAccessListener (priority 84) that allows rate-limited
unauthenticated access to configured public paths. Authenticated users
bypass this listener entirely via AcceptListener/AllowListener.
New components:
- PublicPathMatcher service with wildcard path matching (* and **)
and optional host-prefix scoping
- PublicAccessListener applying per-IP rate limiting to public paths
- Separate public_limiter compound rate limiter (burst + sustained)
- publicRateLimitCache pool (APCu in prod, array in tests)
New env vars:
- PUBLIC_PATHS (comma-separated path patterns, empty = disabled)
- PUBLIC_BURST_COUNT/PUBLIC_BURST_TIME (default 100/60s)
- PUBLIC_UPPER_COUNT/PUBLIC_UPPER_TIME (default 500/3600s)
Tests: 52 new tests (29 unit for PublicPathMatcher, 12 unit for
PublicAccessListener, 11 functional for PublicAccessFlowTest).
Total: 293 tests, 605 assertions, all passing.
PHP CS Fixer: 0 of 63 files need fixing.
Documentation: README, CHANGELOG, ROADMAP, Caddyfile, example.env
all updated with public access configuration and examples.
Add REMOTE_USER env var with four modes:
- session (default): sends session id, backward-compatible
- static: sends a fixed string (REMOTE_USER_STATIC)
- mapped: looks up session id in REMOTE_USER_MAP
- none: omits the header entirely
New RemoteUserMode enum, ConfigBag parsing/validation, and
StringTrait::authSuccessResponse resolves the header value based
on the configured mode. AcceptListener now receives ConfigBag as
a constructor dependency.
Addresses design consideration 1.2 (Remote-User header value is
user-controlled) from DESIGN_CONSIDERATIONS.md.
241 tests pass, 0 cs-fixer violations.
Security:
- Add SecurityHeadersListener (X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options,
CSP, Referrer-Policy, HSTS)
- Replace document.write() with document.documentElement.innerHTML
in login JS to avoid CSP violations
- Add CSS escaping (|e('css')) to env color values in _style.html.twig
- Document CSRF protection model: nonce serves as CSRF token for POST
form path (single-use, server-generated, 120s TTL)
- Reduce TOTP verification window from 10 periods (±5 min) to 1 (±30s)
- Remove hardcoded APP_SECRET from bin/franken.sh (now uses env or
generates random)
- Remove backup code values from debug log output
- Add .env to .gitignore
Bug fixes:
- Fix ->json access on possibly-null in LoginListener
(uses null-safe operator ?->)
- Fix validReturn() not checking false from parse_url (could cause
TypeError on malformed URLs)
- Add isHit() race condition check in AcceptListener and AllowListener
- Add try/finally in Kernel::terminate() so parent::terminate() always
runs even if persist() throws
- Add input validation to GenerateBackupCodesCommand (reject count < 1)
- Use Response::HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR constant in GetTotpTrait
instead of literal 500
Docker/CI:
- Explicitly install curl in Docker final image (needed for healthcheck)
- Update workflow tag pattern to v*.*.* (standardize on v-prefix)
- Extract version without v-prefix for Docker image tag
- Remove stale develop branch from CI triggers
- Fix publish.yaml git remote add to use set-url on re-runs
Code quality:
- Add declare(strict_types=1) to all interface files
- Add #[AsCommand] attribute to GenerateBackupCodesCommand
- Fix BackupCodeInterface default count to match implementation (10)
- Lowercase host before TLD lookup in DomainManager
- Expand TLD list with many missing multi-part TLDs (.com.au, .co.jp,
.com.br, .co.kr, .com.tw, .co.za, etc.) to prevent open redirect
vulnerabilities
- Disable unused Symfony sessions in framework.yaml
Tests:
- Update DomainManagerTest for corrected TLD parsing (.com.au, .co.jp,
.com.br now correctly recognized as multi-part)
- Update GetTotpTraitTest for corrected error message
- Update GenerateBackupCodesCommandTest: zero count now throws exception
- Add TestKernel that removes the kernel.reset tag from nonceCache,
rateLimitCache, sessionCache and sessionStorage pools so in-memory
state survives across requests within a single test (mirroring APCu
persistence in production)
- Add config/packages/test/ with array cache adapters and test session
config
- Set fixed TOTP secret (JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP) and high rate limits in
phpunit.dist.xml and .env.test so functional tests can compute valid
codes and are not rate-limited
- Make Kernel non-final so TestKernel can extend it
- Fix testFailedLoginWithSpentNonceIsRejected and
testConsumedBackupCodeCannotBeReused: clear the CookieJar between
sub-requests so a session cookie set by a prior successful login does
not auto-authenticate the next request via AcceptListener before the
nonce/backup-code path is exercised
- Add phpunit/phpunit ^13.2, symfony/browser-kit and symfony/css-selector
to require-dev, plus the autoload-dev mapping for App\Tests- Add phpunit.dist.xml (strict deprecation/notice/warning failures,
APP_ENV=test forced) and .env.test / bin/phpunit / tests/bootstrap.php
from the PHPUnit recipe
- Add tests/Support/TotpTestHelper providing a deterministic TOTP
fixture, frozen clock and ConfigBag/cache-pool helpers
- Add 121 unit tests covering Clock, ConfigBag, Data/Payload, Enum/Scope,
MonitorCacheKeys, PersistCache, Utilities, all five Traits and the
three Service managers (BackupCode, Domain, Login)
- Fix LoginManagerTest nonce lookups to use makeCacheKey() so the cache
key matches the one the manager actually reads/writes
- Gitignore bin/.phpunit.result.cache
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